Confirming this is the case. The revenue that can be allocated flexibly to veASF or otherwise can be seen in this query under “PIL” https://dune.com/queries/5524737/8998050
Jiano brings up a valid point that utilizing the current boost logic is by far the most efficient way to get this show on the road. Changing this will require additional dev time
So it sounds like we are aligning on the simplest and fairest design is to re‑use the existing veASF Boost Weight logic to determine a depositor’s multiplier. veASF is already calculated as locked ASF × lock‑weeks ÷ 52, rewarding longer locks. This is fair, but someone who is locked in for 10 years will have the same rewards as someone who just locked in for 52 weeks.
Under that formula, some user A with 1000 ASF locked for 52 weeks (Boost Weight = 1000) earns Base APY × (1 + 0.1) = 1.1× APY, while a whale with 10k ASF locked reaches the cap at 2.5. This will get a meaningful extra yield and whales cannot monopolise all rewards. I suppose this is similar to what Curve use. Curve’s gauges allow a 1 to 2.5x boost based on veCRV share. There is also and AshSwap with weighted rewards 40 on LP stake and 60% on veASH share, capping the boost at ~2.5×
Can’t edit this, I guess the option for that timed out, but the actual calc is veASF = locked ASF amount * locked weeks / 10. Now, I actually think we can experiment with both. 5x seems a bit much… but I guess we can tweak the cap too.
Given that the current system allows locking up to 52 weeks, it seems we already have a solid foundation for applying Boost Weight logic. That said, I’d be curious to know if the core team has any thoughts on how this mechanism might evolve — especially in terms of incentive design or governance weight scaling.
If there’s interest in exploring refinements or extensions, perhaps we could outline a few directions and see if one is worth drafting into a Level 2 proposal.
Would be great to understand what’s technically feasible and whether there’s already something in motion on this front.
This is from @0xvertigo:
Boosted yields for veASF holders or for sUSDaf holders? The former is very easy to do. The latter would mean sUSDaf would have to go thru a whole contract migration
Below is a draft proposal outlining options for managing revenue generated by Asymmetry, primarily from USDaf (and potentially afCVX in the near future too).
In order to ascertain the proper path forward, I will pose three questions that I hope you keep in mind when reading and coming to a conclusion.
How do you ensure ecosystem & product liquidity can continue to grow sustainably?
How do you reward contributors to create a flourishing ecosystem that grows + lasts into perpetuity?
How do you sustainably reward tokenholders and attract new ones to the ecosystem?
Revenue sharing. It’s no secret this is the most demanded aspect of the protocol. As of October 15, 2025, here are best estimates for the revenue available for DAO governance decisions. Note that afCVX figures are projections, while USDaf reflects actual inflows.
To date, all USDaf revenue has been allocated to incentivizing USDaf liquidity providers (LPs) on Curve and Convex via StakeDAO’s Votemarket.
As of October 9, 2025, Yearn has agreed to share sUSDaf performance fees, introducing an additional revenue stream as detailed below.
Some users will ask, why was revenue higher in previous epochs (2 weeks) compared to this current one?
The chart below has your answer. The average interest rate paid by USDaf borrowers on the largest branches came down from ~4% to ~1%. While this is fantastic for borrowers, it naturally reduces Asymmetry’s overall revenue.
Several approaches exist for handling this revenue.
We’ll begin with direct revenue distribution to veASF holders, using veASF data for context.
As of October 7, 2025, there are 166 veASF lockers in total, with 68 freeze events and 42 unfreeze events. This results in 26 frozen positions where veASF voting power does not decay linearly toward the unlock date.
Thank you to @pastelfork for building out the extensive modeling that I will refer to in the next section. Note that all the below figures are shown on a weekly basis, meaning that if $2,000 is input as the Revenue to Distribute, that is assuming that $2,000 is distributed on a weekly basis. The same goes for all of the other numbers shown below.
Without turning on fees to afCVX, below are the simulated (and estimated) results for a direct revenue distribution to veASF holders.
There are 4,533,024.5 veASF in existence at this moment. Napkin math would dictate that the average APR for a locked veASF is ~7%. Of course those users locking larger amounts of ASF for extended periods—positioning themselves at the higher end of the distribution—would achieve superior yields.
Examples:
For a new user locking 100,000 ASF for 52 weeks, they could expect a lucrative ~45% APR. In contrast, locking the same amount for 10 weeks yields about 9.5% APR
Adding afCVX Fees
If a 10% performance fee is activated on afCVX, these figures improve significantly:
100,000 ASF locked for 52 weeks: ~76% APR.
100,000 ASF locked for 10 weeks: ~16% APR.
It is likely this will attract ASF buyers to the ecosystem and take ASF off of the market and lock it up, a very attractive prospect for the ecosystem. However, it is worth noting that revenue needs to continue to grow to sustain this as more users come in and dilute the available revenue to be distributed. Currently there are not a lot of veASF locked relative to the supply of ASF itself, so each wallet that has locked would receive a large amount of revenue.
Note that if this option is selected, team will prioritize the contract + frontend flow for having a “claim” button, but there is a small amount of dev time required to test and get it right.
Instead of distributions, revenue could fund POL purchases, such as vePENDLE, vlCVX, or veCRV—All of these are cashflowing assets and serve strategic purposes.
If the DAO purchased $400k of vlCVX, which earns ~ 20% APY, the DAO only produces $80k/yr in revenue. Of course, the DAO owns the vlCVX which is great, but the output is much lower for distributions. Additionally, in that scenario, the DAO is not voting with the vlCVX towards furthering the protocol’s growth. To vote “selflessly”, you effectively sacrifice most yield gained. If the DAO wished to take a very long-term mindset and prioritize growth and “owning your liquidity” above all, this path should be considered. This option suits a long-term strategy focused on ecosystem expansion and liquidity ownership over immediate payouts.
Revenue could also buy back and burn ASF. At current levels (~$200,000 USD annually), it is my opinion that this option is the weakest for creating any meaningful demand, value capture, or ecosystem catalyst for growth.
Continue directing all revenue toward liquidity incentives for USDaf.
Historically, bribing on Curve, Convex, and Fx yields $1.50–$2.50+ in CRV or FXN emissions per $1 of USDaf spent—an extremely efficient mechanism for attracting users and expanding the Asymmetry ecosystem growth.
A balanced approach could allocate a portion of revenue to USDaf incentives while distributing the remainder to veASF holders, combining growth with direct rewards.
The community may also consider a hybrid model, perhaps between allocating some revenue to continue to incentivize USDaf LP’s (Option 4), while some revenue goes to veASF holders (Option 1).
With this in mind, I will summarize:
Option 1: Direct Revenue Distribution to veASF Holders
Option 2: Protocol-Owned Liquidity (POL) Acquisition
Option 3: Buyback
Option 4: No Action, continue USDaf incentives
Option 5: Hybrid of Option 1 & Option 4
Revenue growth—and thus potential distributions—hinges on USDaf expansion. Premature redistribution risking USDaf contraction could trigger a negative feedback loop, diminishing long-term payouts.
Conversely, making ASF more desirable through distributions could amplify the impact of existing incentives, indirectly boosting USDaf rewards and creating a positive feedback loop. Predicting the net effect is challenging due to numerous variables, but both paths warrant careful evaluation.
To what extent is nearly impossible to say as there are a multitude of variables to consider. Both approaches have merit and possible tradeoffs.
Additionally, it’s important that the DAO review and reconsider the direction on a quarterly basis to ensure there is proper alignment between all stakeholders and the community at large. This vote could be viewed as testing one of the options above before periodic review.
Finally, the community should keep in mind that creating a sustainable ecosystem that rewards contributors into perpetuity to ensure that Asymmetry outlives us all is of vital importance. By emulating mature DAO’s like Yearn and others - which allocate revenue to incentivize contributors - ensures the protocol attracts new talent and continues to grow forever.
First of all, shoutout to Pastelfork for these awesome models
IMO I think finding the sweet spot of a balance in Option 5 could be effective both in terms of rewarding existing veASF lockers in boosted yields, and continuing to attract new TVL via incentives from revenue generated. Keen to see what the community says here too
Edit: Another Idea (Option 6 I guess lmao): Could we use revenue to give boosted yields to those only with veASF AND sUSDaf. i.e. Boosted yield is sprinkled on top of their sUSDaf yields dependent on your veASF
This would create a symbiotic relationship between veASF holders and the USDaf product. I’d have to give this some more thought but, throwing this in the mix too
Honestly, I am starting to think that revenue right now is not worth it. I assume Asymm target group is people who want a reliable safe and secure yielding mechanism. The product satisfies their needs. Not sure if the token (doing basicly the same) would be interesting to the user.
I’m starting to like the idea of protocol owned liquidity maybe more.
And what about using the revenue to fuel the TVL and have a DAO owned loan on asymm itself with multiply and distribute the yield from that?
By this we create a floor of TVL based on the revenue and that will keep on giving, even if the rev goes down after a year, we still having a 30%-40% of whatever we have gained that year.
Didnt think it much through yet but might also be intersting to look at.
Big fan of option 5. Think it could be tailored a bit. Maybe turn rev share on after certain growth metrics are hit.
I am big fan of option 5. I am just an ASF holder and I would happily lock it for rev share. There are two groups of users so rewards should be split. Those who want the yield and those who back the project. Similar to how a lot of the 3,3 dexs have LP rewards and also voting incentives. I know this isn’t the same but in those model both types of investor get rewards for being active.
I was thinking about option 5 but it stagnates the protocol’s growth by rewarding current investors in the short term if I understand well, while I prefer long term growth, therefore I would say option 1.
Option 1. I think revenue share is far away but at this moment we need to find a way to protect current investors and bring new $ASF investors on board, option 1 will do this. Nevertheless, the protocol needs to grow first and we need marketing and incentives (option 4) for USDaf. So it is important to give clarity and determine a rough target when option 1 comes into effect, atleast the $ASF holders have a reason to hold it now for and lock it into veASF when time is there. Meanwhile we use the revenue for marketing untill target is reached.
If we take option 1 in good, optimal shape with a target when this comes into effect I am sure this is automatically a great USP for marketing and would strengthen the protocol. Besides sUSDaf whales can jump can jump into $ASF for a cheap share for potential revenue. They might be rotating in both $veASF and $USDaf, so money keeps circulating in ecosystem. If we can get $ASF back on track it would give more eyes to the project again, imo with utility this would work. Altough the way for revenue share might be far away, people can take advantage now buying a cheap share forward.
Here is my mental model and how I view things:
Primary Goal: Achieve a critical mass of Total Value Locked (TVL) and establish deep, stable liquidity for core pairs.
Entry Trigger: Protocol launch.
Exit Trigger / Transition to Phase 2:
TVL > $300 Million AND
Average Weekly Protocol Revenue > $75,000 (sustained for 4 consecutive weeks).
Allocation Strategy: Aggressively favor liquidity.
85% to LP Incentives: Focus on deepening key pools (e.g., USDaf/scrvUSD, ASF/ETH).
0% to ASF Buybacks.
0% to veASF Revenue Share or Strategic Treasury.
Primary Goal: Achieve a critical mass of Total Value Locked (TVL) and establish deep, stable liquidity for core pairs.
Exit Trigger / Transition to Phase 2:
TVL > $500 Million AND/OR
Average Weekly Protocol Revenue > $100,000 (sustained for 4 consecutive weeks).
Allocation Strategy: Aggressively favor liquidity.
90% to LP Incentives: Focus on deepening key pools (e.g., USDaf/scrvUSD, ASF/ETH).
10% to ASF Buybacks: Provide initial, gentle price support to counteract any early emissions that were used to fuel the Bootstrap phase
0% to veASF Revenue Share or Strategic Treasury.
Primary Goal: Balance growth with holder rewards, retain capital, and begin diversifying the treasury.
Allocation Strategy: Introduce a hybrid system with a base allocation and a dynamic, market-driven component.
A. Base Allocation (70% of Revenue):
40% to LP Incentives: Maintain healthy liquidity levels.
20% to veASF Revenue Share: Begin rewarding veASF holders with direct, stable yield.
10% to Strategic Treasury: Start accumulating key assets (e.g., CVX, PENDLE) for long-term growth.
B. Dynamic Allocation (30% of Revenue): This portion is allocated based on real-time market indicators.
Condition: ASF Token is Oversold (e.g., 7-day RSI < 30)
Condition: A Strategic Asset is Oversold (e.g., CRV 7-day RSI < 30)
Condition: Neutral Market (Neither of the above conditions is met)
Action: Split the 30% allocation:
10% to veASF Revenue Share (boosting holder yield).
10% to Strategic Asset (keep pumping POL).
10% to ASF Buybacks (providing steady buy pressure and beef up the DAO treasury; let’s not forget the DAO is getting some of that veASF revenue as well).
Primary Goal: Defend the protocol’s core value during a prolonged bear market or decline in usage.
Entry Trigger:
Sustained TVL decline of > 60% from its peak OR
Average Weekly Protocol Revenue < $XYZ (sustained for 8 consecutive weeks).
Allocation Strategy: Shift focus from growth to value preservation.
Complicated? Possible, but I am thinking we can re-use a lot of the Liquity (other voting/distributing) infrastructure to execute the rewards distribution. Without a gradual roll out of options in phases, I don’t really see things working out or being sustainable.
I actually think you can structure it in a way where you have all options on the table:
Of course you’ll need to have some type of formula that looks at the performance of ASF, CRV, and PENDLE. You also need to make sure you are incentivizing liquidity pools in some way. If everyone yanks their liquidity to lock veASF instead, then all your emissions can get sold into super thin liquidity cratering the ASF price and therefore sentiment. You also need to make veASF look enticing…
It’s the same ponzi game discussion since DeFi summer and the Curve wars with mercenary liquidity constantly crunching numbers. Striking the balance between prioritizing growth and ensuring your native token doesn’t crater 95% from ATHs is a delicate balance to strike. I think it also might be good to have a moratorium for selling $ASF for any reason whatsoever at certain price points. If people are down 70% from their pre-sale SAFT price and are still locked, then there’s something fatally flawed in the design. I don’t think there’s anything wrong with showing the world that you are committed to building a protocol for the benefit of your core believers ($ASF holders) and not using them as a sacrificial lamb to make USDAF look shinier.
I don’t know how you compensate yourself and the team, but those incentives should be aligned very closely with the success of $ASF. I’d argue your team compensation should be structured in a way that $ASF can never be sold by them, and your success and pay is in veASF emissions like the rest of your holders.
Yeah, I do agree, it doesn’t make sense to sell at 1 -10 cents, something is breaking at these prices.
Take my advice for what it’s worth, but just wanted to contribute because I am a fan of Asymmetry and what you guys are doing:
My two cents. But with slippage they are worth 1.5 cents. 
Agreed, let’s vote on this <3
These percentages are also not hardcoded, but just to show that there might be more configurability as to where the revenue can flow.
Would it be fair to say, thus far, that Option 5 is seemingly most popular?
We could model some numbers to determine the split between how much we put to veASF and how much we continues for LP incentives
thank you for bringing this up to be voted
I am fond of option 5 indeed but may I suggest a potential option 6 that would trigger also a buy & burn?
This option sends most revenue to veASF holders, keeps some incentives for USDaf, and burns only when revenue is high. Essentially is making sure that only when substantial burns can be made, the option to buyback and burn would trigger
1) Revenue is always split the same way
80% to veASF holders
20% to USDaf incentives
2) There is an APR target for veASF
We aim to keep veASF distributions around 20% APR
Distribute only the amount needed to reach that 20%
3) If revenue is higher than needed
Anything from the veASF portion above the 20% APR level is burned
Burn = perma-lock so it cannot ever be claimed or move to burn addy
USDaf incentives (the 20%) are never burned.
The 80% going to veASF does not hit 20% APR
Result: veASF gets all 80% and no burning happens
The 80% share would push APR above 20%
Result: Only enough is paid to hit 20% APR
The extra part of that 80% is burned instead
Say monthly revenue = $50,000
80% = $40,000 goes to veASF
20% = $10,000 goes to USDaf
But if veASF only needs $30,000 to reach 20% APR:
$30,000 → paid to holders
$10,000 (excess) → burned
$10,000 → USDaf incentives as usual
In summary this is kind of a solution that scales in time in order to bring substantial real yield and value to $ASF lockers
Forgive me if this was discussed earlier.. but can we get a systen where users of the protocol (borrowers) are incentivised to hold the token. As well as dividends for shareholders.. Creditcard companies have spent millions on research on human physcology.. and what we love is getting something and you see it everywhere.. i just saw an ad for coinbase and amex giving bitcoin rebates… we could give borrowers a rebate based on their VeASF multiplier and the actual interest/time they have their loans.. it could be Usdaf/opASF or a mix. So essentially we take part of their interest and when x happens (loan close/3 months) we give it back (or something else).. could almost be set up similar as gems.. .. as time passes borrower see their cashback in dashboard go up.. … in spain. Similar… At banco santander.. if you own over 5k of shares you pay no account holding charges.. maybe opasaf conversion could be cheaper if you already hold veasf.. .. so One incentive concept for token holders and another for borrowers. Two clear stories.
