Since the launch of the USDaf product in August, Asymmetry Finance has seen a notable increase in protocol revenue. Much of this revenue is currently being reinvested to expand the protocol’s presence in the DeFi space through various initiatives. However, veASF holders—those who have locked their ASF tokens to support the long-term vision of the protocol—are currently excluded from these benefits.
At present, veASF holders only accrue “gems,” whose utility remains undefined. Meanwhile, other contributors to the protocol, especially those using stablecoins, not only earn gems but also receive a clear APR for their participation. This creates a structural imbalance: stablecoin users benefit from lower risk and higher returns, while veASF holders—who are exposed to ASF token volatility—receive less in return.
Such an imbalance discourages new buyers from acquiring and locking ASF tokens, as they can achieve better yields with less risk through alternative strategies within the same protocol.
I would like to propose a discussion around the possibility of granting veASF holders access to APR rewards on their locked tokens. This could help restore incentive alignment and ensure that long-term supporters of the protocol are not penalized for their commitment.
Looking forward to hearing your thoughts and feedback.
I’d like to explore this more. I’ve seen some WIP internal modeling of boosted yields for veASF holders. Would be cool to see some ideas of numbers once ready
Yea, introducing a boosted yield could serve as a compelling incentive for users to buy and hold the ASF token.
Boost Weight = Locked $ASF * (Lock Weeks / 52)
Boosted APY = Base APY * min(1 + (Boost Weight / Max Weight), 2.5)
revenue
20%? for buyback and use as boost reward
40% for liquidity incentives
40% for stability buffer
maybe instead of 40% in stability buffer go for 20% and 20% for fee discount
I think its great oportunity for big boys to stake asf for booster and fee discount, if we get adoption we can gradually replace this with burning asf
Hey, I really like the direction you’re taking with the boost mechanism — it’s a solid way to reward long-term commitment.
About the Max Weight part, I think it’s key to keep things balanced. Here’s how I see it working:
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If someone locks 5,000 ASF for 52 weeks, their Boost Weight is 5,000.
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Let’s say Max Weight is set to 10,000 — then their Boosted APY becomes:
Base APY * min(1 + (5,000 / 10,000), 2.5)→ which equalsBase APY * 1.5.
This way, even smaller holders get meaningful boosts, while bigger players don’t dominate the system. And if someone locks 20,000 ASF, they’d hit the cap at 2.5x — fair, but not excessive. It’s scalable and keeps incentives aligned.
Now, on the buyback and burn idea — I personally lean in a different direction. I’m not a fan of using protocol revenue to buy tokens on the market just to burn them. It’s a flashy move, but it doesn’t create sustainable value for participants. I’d much rather see those funds used to generate APR for veASF holders or boost rewards directly. That way, the value flows back to the community in a transparent and ongoing way.
Also, about reducing the stability buffer from 40% to 20% — I’d be cautious there.
Just my toughts— happy to hear other views!
Low Tier (500-2,000 $ASF): 1.05-1.2x (10.5-12% APY).
Mid Tier (2,000-5,000 $ASF): 1.2-1.5x (12-15% APY).
High Tier (>5,000 $ASF): 1.5-2.5x (15-25% APY, capped).
Max Weight = 10,000
Low Tier (Penny Holder)Deposit: 5,000 USDaf
veASF: 1,000 $ASF (~1,000 USD at 1 USD/ASF), locked for 52 weeks
Boost Weight: 1,000 * (52/52) = 1,000
Boosted APY:
10% * min(1 + (1,000 / 10,000), 2.5) = 10% * min(1 + 0.1, 2.5) = 10% * 1.1 = 11%
Profit from Boosting:Yield: 5,000 * 0.11 = 550 USD/year (~45.83 USD/month)
Effective APY: 550 / 5,000 = 11%
Incentivization: A modest but accessible 1.1x boost encourages retail investors to lock small amounts of $ASF (~1,000 USD).
Mid Tier (Small Holder)Deposit: 20,000 USDaf
veASF: 3,000 $ASF (~3,000 USD), locked for 52 weeks
Boost Weight: 3,000 * (52/52) = 3,000
Boosted APY:
10% * min(1 + (3,000 / 10,000), 2.5) = 10% * min(1 + 0.3, 2.5) = 10% * 1.3 = 13%
Profit from Boosting:Yield: 20,000 * 0.13 = 2,600 USD/year (~216.67 USD/month)
Effective APY: 2,600 / 20,000 = 13%
Incentivization: A moderate 1.3x boost motivates mid-tier holders to lock larger amounts of $ASF (~3,000 USD).
High Tier (Whale Holder)Deposit: 100,000 USDaf
veASF: 10,000 $ASF (~10,000 USD), locked for 52 weeks
Boost Weight: 10,000 * (52/52) = 10,000
Boosted APY:
10% * min(1 + (10,000 / 10,000), 2.5) = 10% * min(1 + 1, 2.5) = 10% * 2.5 = 25%
Profit from Boosting:Yield: 100,000 * 0.25 = 25,000 USD/year (~2,083.33 USD/month)
Effective APY: 25,000 / 100,000 = 25%
Incentivization: A high 2.5x boost incentivizes locking large $ASF amounts but is capped to prevent dominance.
Let me know if this makes any sense to you and if it can be improved.
Chiming in to say this is a great discussion. I can provide further thoughts later but just noting that veASF already has a built in boost mechanism that mirrors the boost from other successful ve models. See the image below for the effective boost
If we explore this, I don’t think token-gating the current USDaf yield is smart, as it risks alienating users and overcomplicating incentives. Instead, we can tie protocol revenue into the mix by redirecting a portion of the revenue to boost USDaf yields exclusively for veASF holders (from both ASF and opASF locks). This boost, increasing USDaf’s existing APY based on lock duration and amount, would reward long-term commitment without restricting base yields for other users.
I sorta like it.
This is the way I see it has two parts:
- Yield boost for USDaf depositors: Let users who lock ASF for veASF earn higher APY on their USDaf deposits. Define a boost weight as
locked ASF × (lock weeks ÷ 52)and set a maximum weight (e.g. 10 000). The depositor’s yield becomesBase APY × min(1 + (boost weight ÷ max weight), cap), with a cap around 2.5× to prevent whales from dominating. This gives small lockers a modest boost and large lockers a higher but bounded boost.
And in the future we can add:
- Share protocol revenue with veASF holders: Allocate a fixed portion of borrower PIL proceeds directly to veASF stakers. A simple split could be 40 % of net revenue to veASF holders, 40% to liquidity incentives (for USDaf stability pools and LPs that can be voted upon using veASF as well) and 20% to a reserve/DAO fund for stability and future incentives.
I was also thinking about it, but at the moment it doesn’t make sense due to low profits. Imo at 1B we can start to think about revenue share. For now I’d like to scale
Wenjamin how should look spliting rewards if we go into your idea? Do you think that dividing according to my formula above would also work or would the already existing veasf multiplier be enough?
Honestly I’d just be throwing out random numbers, but the concept itself intrigues me. I think this is a great method to recycle revenue in a way that benefits the ecosystem instead of potentially drying it up or adding unnecessary gating. Revenue will be used to directly enhance product yield while also driving demand for ASF and opASF, building out the POL warchest. It could be something like 40/40/20 (@RomanPope ‘s suggestion), or maybe even 50/30/20.
Whatever the split works out to be, it will need to make sense for someone to lock up a large amount of ASF (or opASF) to gain the most benefit on their yield, but we also need to leave some room to incentivize LPs and build reserves.
Today I will delve into the thoughts of Benjamin. Vertigo what do we exactly need for phase 2?
We should still start thinking about 1B, a complete strategy is better than a piece-wise one to illustrate the whole picture and potential. Plus, to promise is not to marry. It can always change.
I think the multiplier should be different from veASF, especially since we are also mixing in opASF in there. I think this needs to be explored a bit more. Right now, it’s possible to get veASF for locking USDaf into opASF, I am not 100% sure how that was established. @0xvertigo can you walk us through that?
Yeah, We can change it. That’s why I want to start spliting revenue for ASF holders. Boosting is much more work to do. Hopefully we can all agree that we need to start somewhere
I would definitely like to hear what the team has explored so far. Seems like @AF_JZ hinted that the team already had WIP internal modeling of boosted yields for veASF holders.
Just a quick note to help align everyone on an important constraint I’ve had confirmed via Discord:
The 75% of protocol revenue allocated to the Stability Pool is immutable.
This means we cannot modify how that portion is distributed — neither the percentage nor the internal logic of allocation can be changed.
So any proposal involving boosted yields, veASF incentives, or redistribution of rewards must operate within the 25% protocol revenue that is governed and flexible.
This is a key design limitation, and I think it’s important that we all keep it in mind as we explore ideas. It doesn’t block innovation — but it does shape where and how we can implement it.
Hope @0xvertigo can confirm or clarify this information so we can all move forward with proposals that are aligned with the protocol’s actual constraints.
Now that we’ve clarified the protocol constraints — namely that the 75% revenue allocated to the Stability Pool is immutable — I think it’s important to focus on what can be done within the 25% governed portion.
Given that most contributors seem aligned around the idea of introducing a boosted yield (which I personally support as a concept), and considering that a revenue share may only make sense once the protocol scales further, I’d like to propose a simple and fair interim solution.
Let’s allocate a portion of the 25% protocol revenue to enhance USDaf APY for veASF holders, using the existing Boost Weight logic — the same one already embedded in how veASF is calculated based on lock duration and amount.
This avoids introducing a new multiplier system and ensures consistency with the current veASF design.
It’s also worth noting that users who opt into opASF are indirectly included, since once they exercise their option, those tokens become veASF and would qualify for the same boost.
This approach respects the current design, leverages the implicit boost already embedded in veASF calculations, and offers a scalable path forward — without overcomplicating things .
It also seems to be the fastest and most practical way to address the current imbalance, while remaining flexible enough to be revised in the future if needed — avoiding wasted effort on mechanisms that may become obsolete as the protocol evolves.